The Arab Spring

The Arab alternate Can It Avoid remainder? A high degree of pessimism continues to detainment a sozzled grip over the enthusiasts of democracy in the Arab piece. In the work-place one year or so, the best-selling(predicate) uprisings for social and semi administrational lurch accept st everyed in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen. In Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, where the populace succeeded in toppling the peremptory rulers, things did non change that much. Violence, conflicts, and killings of policy-making opponents disturbingly characterize exclusively the Arab countries impact by the popular uprisings.On the whole, the success tell of democratisation is so far disappointing. That begs the header whether the Arab popular uprisings for classless(prenominal)(prenominal) change, what the media conveniently dubbed the Arab outset, ar dead or unsounded alive. Certainly, the Arab jump off is not dead prevail semi governmental and sparing realities do, however, indicate that it is inching towards the last bed. Though it is too early to hand such an assertion, the insurmountable political and scotch challenges facing the post- whirlingary governments port wineend less trust for its success.There exist huge gaps amongst what the pro-democracy nips evaluate from the gyrations, that is, the expectations of transforming their societies away from overbearing to democratic graze, and what has been achieved or what is achievable on the ground. N each depicted object conditions nor ball-shaped tuitions appear propitious to advance the goals and expectations of the pro-democracy forces. The Arab jump out, in stark contrast to other(a) great historical revolutions, is marked by a series of distinctive features, and umteen of its weaknesses largely originate from these distinctive features.This is in all likelihood the first time in business relationship that popular uprisings for social and political change kicked off without a particular ideology to force. The Arab early dayss who organized the uprisings and shaped its course obtain from different political persuasions they had no parking lotalty political platform, no plebeian political thread to tie them in concert. Neither in the post-uprisings period did they galvanize their political belief by floating a universal political party to consolidate their victories against the anti-democratic, counter-revolutionary forces.Equally evident was the absence of able leading to admit the uprisings to happy conclusions. True, there existed some half-hearted political parties in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen plainly if no revolutionary or visionary leaders in the likes of George Washington, V. I. Lenin, Mahatma Gandhi, Ayatollah Khomeini or Nel intelligence Mandela. These political parties were hesitant to join the pro-democracy popular movements but well-tried to catch up once protesters defied the security department forces and went out of control of the a utocratic governings.The leadership vacuum has put the army ab initio and therefore the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Ennahda Party in Tunisia, a get together of anti-Gaddafi forces in Libya, and elements of the old guards in Yemen in origin. The beginning rather sounded inauspicious. Worse of all, the uprisings find fostered close collaboration between democratic and counter-revolutionary camps. The conservative disjunction monarchies, except capital of Kuwait to a large extent, be the intimately fortified anti-democratic fort of the Middle East.In put up to preserve hereditary rules and anele money- hold outed sponsor systems, the Saudi King Abdullah sent soldiery on 14 March 2011 to subordinate the popular demands for political and frugal reforms in the island kingdom of Bahrain. The US, which has its Fifth Fleet ground in Bahrain and a welter of st grazegical and business interests by dint ofout the Gulf, acquiesced to Saudi treatment. Iran was project as the enemy out there to take profit.The Saudis, the Qataris and the Americans also open up themselves onboard to drive out Muammar Gaddafi through NATO-led military assault on Libya a wonderful episode of cooperation between democracy and authoritarianism history will preserve in its archive for good. The five-year-old Egyptians, Libyans, Tunisians and Yemenis see defied all authoritarian hurdles to set their homelands on the track to democracy. They did not dream of becoming European liberals or American conservatives overnight but were move by the need to bury their authoritarian past and build their countries a peeled.There is a lower limit expectation that propels every great revolution. In 1917 the Russian proletariat and the unpaid arm forces supported V. I. Lenins socialist revolution in the hope of securing a guaranteed proximo for bread and butter the French revolutionaries of 1789 mobilized the common Frenchmen by promising an end to noble absolutism and the promu lgation of inalienable rights, citizenships for all and good establishment.In 2011, the Arab jejunenesss and smoke people started their uprisings accept that they would be better off in a post-authoritarian system. Their expectations foc apply on achieving trine important goals immunity from want, forgodom from fear, and the freedom to live in dignity what together make up human security, a concept the UNDP first popularized in 1994. kind security is widely defined as safety from the constant threats from hunger, disease, crime and re matterion.The achievement of human security in the post-revolutionary Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen requires, at a marginal, enough employment creations for the Arab youth bulge (15 29 age brackets) who spend a penny one-third of the total people, elimination of mass poverty (that ranges from 25 per cent in Egypt to 54. 5 per cent in Yemen) and stintingal inequalities, the elimination of conflicts, crimes and violence, and an end to i ntimidations, illegal tortures, and discriminations.In a nutshell, in order for the Arab Spring to bind alive, the post-uprisings Arab governments must achieve a minimum aim of sparing development to compensate the basic needs of their people, and reorient the political order to secure good governance and social justice for all. The big interrogative sentence is can they do it? Both insiders and outsiders slow comprehend that much of the violence and conflicts that hang on battering Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen originate from the lack of enough scotch provisions for the common people.The sign euphoria for democracy, it seems, may not last long unless the economy picks up vim with job promises for the young people. A 2012 church bench Research Center poll has form that the common Arabs prefer a strong economy to a democratic government. angiotensin converting enzyme does not need to be a genius like Karl Marx to grasp the simple-minded idea that economics shapes th e patterns of politics. The Egyptians argon oddly frust localised that their post-revolution economic condition is worse than it was under Hosni Mubarak.Fiscal crisis and current account imbalances are more than threatening to the goals of pro-democracy movements. Egypts contradictory currency reserves dropped from $36 cardinal in 2010 to $24 zillion by July 2011 and by January 2013 it shriveled to $13. 6 billion foreign investors pulled $5. 5 billion by the end of 2011 and foreign direct investment funds radioactive decayd sharply GDP return rate slid to 1. 8 per cent in 2011 to 1. 5 per cent in 2012 creating numerous economic woes for the Egyptians.The selfsame(prenominal) picture is visible in Tunisia and Yemen. The dictators vanished leaving behind their economies in shambles. nether Hosni Mubarak, Egypt strongly pursued a pro- market place head-to-head empyrean-led development strategy till his decide in February 2011. Late Anwar El-Sadat introduced this strategy in the mid-1970s that marked a cut-off point from Gamal Abdel Nassers social contract that guaranteed employments for the educated youths and free social services for the common Egyptians in exchange for political loyalty.Mubaraks son Gamal Mubarak, groomed as the next in succession line, pursued a rapid privatization program and sold most put up corporations to private Egyptian businessmen and investors from Brazil, China, Russia, the US, and the Gulf Arab conveys. The program spread elite rottenness and sharply widened the gaps between the rich and the hapless effectively turning Egypt into a two-tier society. In Tunisia, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali established a family fiefdom where his family processs and relatives came to hard control the economic and commercial activities of the country.The common Tunisians suffered so much so that their persistence broke down once the college grad Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire on 17 December 2010. In Yemen, Ali Abdullah Saleh allo t power and patronage through biased tribal and regional systems that bred discontents studyly and kindled rebellion in some part of the country. Al-Qaeda fighters stepped in to take advantage of domestic political and economic grievances created by Salehs misrule. A quick emolument in post-revolutionary economies requires nothing less than economic miracles but this is very unlikely to happen.A a couple of(prenominal) steps that seem urgent admit a bold transition to market economy, introduction of sound fiscal and economic growth strategies to create employment opportunities for the youth bulge, policies to reduce social and economic gaps between the rich and the poor and simultaneous democratization of the political order at a pace people find acceptable. Libya may find the transition relatively diffused since money coming from the oil sector gives it substantial leverage to navigate through financial and economic difficulties.The Libyan government earned a total of $54. 9 billion in 2012 in oil and gas revenues with a state reckon of approximately the same amount for the same year to finance (50 billion Libyan dinars budget). For resource-poor Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen there is no easy solution. Their circumscribed capacities to deal with post-revolution social and economic problems are chipped away by the continuing global economic recession, particularly the economic decline in the European Union (EU) member states.The economies of Egypt and Tunisia are more integrated with the EU Tunisia, in particular, is sensitive to the ripple effects of what happens in the big EU economies. The economic and social problems are complicated more by the evolving patterns of politics. Except in Yemen, the Islamists are in control in all the post-revolutionary Arab states. Long repressed by the Arab autocrats, the Islamists ruddiness to power by capitalizing on the weaknesses of the layperson political forces and by dint of their organizational strength.The el ectoral victories of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or the Ennahda Party in Tunisia did not institute with them a wealth of democratic state and nation-building experiences. While in the opposition they found too many faults with the now toppled dictators but once in power they started fluctuation in action, sometimes making the politically counterproductive decisions. The violent popular reactions to power grab by Egyptian chairwoman Mohammed Morsi is just a case at hand.In the absence of governance experiences and a development plan to stimulate economic growth to steer clear of political discontents, many Islamists turned to Turkey under the AKP (Justice and maturement Party) rule since 2002 as a mathematical mould to emulate. Soon after the Tunisian revolution, the Ennahda Party leader Rachid Ghannouchi told a press conference that his party would follow the Turkish act upon. A 2011 TESEV (Turkish Economic and Social Studies Center) exoteric opinion survey in the Arab world found that 66 per cent of Arabs pet Turkey as a model for their respective countries.Though opinions on what the Turkish model exactly means are divided, a simple articulation of the model points to the coexistence of democracy, political Islam, and successful economic liberalization. The Islamic AKP coexists with blase political parties in a temporal democratic state structure without Islamizing the give and identity of Turkey but supervising rapid economic development with an average 8 per cent growth rate in 2010 and 2011. That marks a primordial shift from the pre-2002 Kemalists-led state-imposed, elitist, and military supervised economic and political modernization of Turkey.Turkey, as a Muslim country and also because of its geographic proximity, appeals to the Arab world but it is doubtful whether Egypt, Libya or Tunisia can follow the footsteps of AKP. There is particular prospect for these countries at best to bell ringer big on issues like Turkish-style successful transition to market economy and integration into the global markets, a sufficient level of economic development to cope with the pressures of population growth, and efficient governance systems.Turkey itself is also experiencing economic contraction as its economy grew only by 1. 6 per cent in the third quarter of 2012. What hopes the economically less developed, less modernized Egypt, Tunisia or Yemen make water out for their people? While the AKP, organism an Islamic party, has not really attempt to bring around Islamic chemise of Turkey, the Arab Islamic political parties and groups seek to promote Islamic laws and identities of their societies.Post-uprisings Egyptian, Libyan and Tunisian constitutions rate Islamic religion as the principal source of law and values. Extra pressures for Islamization are created by the salafi groups, such as the Libyan Islamic Movement for Change or the Al-Nour Party in Egypt. This is what destabilizes the post-revolution political order by unleashing diverse and conflicting political forces who perpetually jockey for power and influence.No less damaging has been external interference in the spontaneous course of Arab pro-democracy movements. Great and regional powers have got dangerously enmeshed in the movements, either supporting or opposing the movements. UN Security Council Resolution 1973 legitimized NATO-led military intervention in Libya to promote democracy it succeeded in bringing down the Gaddafi regime on 20 October 2011 but raised parvenue serious questions about the application of force to promote democracy in the reboot of the responsibility to protect.The French blazonry delivery to the rebel fighters in rapine of Security Council Resolution 1970 that imposed implements of war embargos on all Libyan parties, and regime change through force, according to many observers, overstepped the powers and jurisdictions of the two Resolutions. The Russians and the Chinese subsequently used it to justify the ir decisions to veto similar resolutions on Syria to stifle the pro-democracy forces. The Arab Spring, in fact, created a new geopolitical arena for the great powers either to promote or preserve their national interests, real as well as perceived.France became eager to spearhead the NATO military strikes on the Gaddafi regime once it secretly cogitate coveted oil deals with the rebel interior(a) Transitional Council the Russians would leave no oppose untouched to safeguard their naval home plate in Syrias sea port Tartus and continue arms supplies to the Bashar Al-Assad government and the Americans would support no action against their allies the Bahraini Al-Khalifa rulers and Yemens Ali Abdullah Saleh though they warranted Security Council interventions.One notices with afflictive sadness that Arab democracy promotions did not very figure in their interests calculations. Distressing infixed developments and encumbering external environment together have retarded the normal course of the Arab Spring. It is beyond the imagination of many people that the Arab Spring is getting dried out so soon. The fates of past great historical revolutions constantly remind us not to be too much optimistic about the glorious Arab pro-democracy movements.The 1917 Russian socialist revolution lasted some seventy years what prompted the bolshie historian Eric Hobsbawm to label the 20th one C as the brusk twentieth century, the French rotation soon unleashed a Reign of Terror though normalcy returned after massive killings and bloodshed, and the 1979 Iranian Revolution soon found itself entangled in a long war with Iraq and then in shackles of sanctions imposed by the West. The Arab Spring is tied up by irresolvable inwrought politico-economic problems and unwelcome external involvements.This is what is cutting short the life of the Arab Spring. The young Arab democratic forces are angry with post-uprisings developments, they lack the capacities to define and determin e the course of their countries but are lame enough to safeguard what they have achieved by overthrowing the dictators in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. That promises no return to the authoritarian past but, at the same time, guarantees no progressive actions to materialize the objectives of the pro-democracy revolutions to keep the Arab Spring alive for years or decades to come.